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Thomas E. MaCurdy and John B. Shoven 
For many people,  the present value of their future pension annuity is their 
largest  financial asset.  The retirement  income may come from a variety of 
pension accumulations,  including defined contribution plans, defined benefit 
plans, individual retirement accounts, Keogh plans, and tax deferred annuity 
plans. With many of  these accumulation vehicles, the individual participant 
bears the responsibility of determining the assets in which the funds are in- 
vested and bears any uncertainty about the rate of return that will be realized 
on those assets. In choosing between stocks and bonds for their pension ac- 
cumulation vehicle, most people probably know that bonds have a lower av- 
erage return and a lower variance in return; bonds offer additional “safety” at 
the expense of a lower expected outcome. While this risk-return  trade-off is 
both correct and well understood for short-term investment horizons, the ex- 
tent to which it applies for long holding periods is not clear. For many work- 
ers, the time between the current contribution to the retirement account and 
the purchase of an annuity is thirty years or more. What is the relative risk and 
return on stocks versus bonds for such a long horizon? The pension participant 
typically  not  only  has  a  long  horizon  but  also  makes  many  contributions 
throughout his or her career. For example, faculty at Stanford University make 
payments  to their retirement  accounts twice each month over their term of 
employment.  How does such a pattern  of purchase affect the relative desira- 
bility of stocks versus bonds as pension accumulation assets? Finally, most 
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individual retirement accounts, Keogh plans, and defined contribution plans 
allow the participant not only to choose which assets are purchased with new 
contributions but  also to move existing accumulations between asset cate- 
gories. This raises the question of the desirability of gradually moving stock 
accumulations into bonds late in one’s career. Such an option offers the poten- 
tial advantage that one’s retirement annuity would depend on the value of the 
stock portfolio at several selling dates rather than just its value on the date of 
purchase of the annuity. 
Several papers investigate the effect of the length of investment horizon on 
optimal portfolio composition (e.g., Fischer 1983; and Merton and Samuel- 
son 1974). Typically, these papers attempt to estimate the stochastic processes 
generating the returns on different assets, within some assumed class of mod- 
els, and then determine optimal portfolios based on the maximization of  ex- 
pected lifetime utility, with the form of the utility function somewhat arbitrar- 
ily chosen. In general, these studies do not find that the length of the horizon 
unambiguously changes the optimal portfolio mix between stocks and bonds. 
Our approach is quite different from the existing literature, and our results 
are more striking. We  examine how some naive investment strategies for pen- 
sion accumulations would have performed for employment careers of varying 
length between  1926 and  1989. Given a strategy, we  calculate the implied 
value for the pension account at the time of retirement for all possible com- 
pleted careers of  a specified horizon within the sixty-four-year period. We 
consider only strategies in which investors allocate their pension contributions 
either entirely into stocks (with all dividends and other returns reinvested in 
stocks) or entirely into bonds (with interest reinvested in bonds). These strat- 
egies are not optimal in any sense since they ignore any market timing issues 
as well as standard portfolio theory. We then consider some strategies for con- 
verting from stocks to bonds as a worker approaches retirement, but we  do 
not attempt to determine the optimal portfolio composition as a function of 
years until retirement. Despite these limitations, we find that an “all stocks” 
strategy dominates all  other  investment policies considered  for all  career 
lengths of  twenty-five years or longer. By “domination,” we mean that an all 
stocks allocation would  have  generated a larger pension  accumulation for 
every career that ended in retirement over the period 1926-89. 
Our findings have important implications for pension investment policies, 
and they suggest that the vast majority of people choose the wrong accumula- 
tion  strategies. Not  only are our results applicable to defined contribution 
plans, but they are also relevant for defined benefit pension programs and for 
other long-horizon saving targets. 
2.1  Stock and Bond Returns 
For  calculating pension  accumulations,  our primary  data  source is  the 
monthly-total-return statistics for stocks and bonds assembled by  Ibbotson 63  Stocks, Bonds, and Pension Wealth 
Associates and published in their Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation: 1990 
Yearbook. For stock accumulations we use their monthly figures for the Stan- 
dard and Poor’s 500 Stock Composite Index (S&P 500),  and for bond portfo- 
lio  accumulations we  use  their  monthly  long-term corporate bond  series, 
which is based on an index compiled by  Salomon Brothers for long-term, 
high-grade  corporate bonds.  Both  the  series are available from December 
1925 to December 1989. 
The statistics of  the annual inflation-adjusted returns for the S&P 500, for 
long-term corporate bonds, and for T-bills are shown below for 1926-88: 
Asset  Arithmetic Mean (%)  Standard Deviation (%) 
S&P 500  8.8  21.1 
Long-term corporates  2.4  10.0 
U.S.  Treasury bills  .5  .5 
Note that equities have an average yield premium of  6.4 percent over long- 
term corporate bonds. These mean real rates of  return imply that $1.00 in- 
vested in  December 1925 in the S&P 500 would have grown with dividends 
reinvested to roughly $76.00 in  real terms by  the end of  1989. One dollar 
invested in  long-term corporate bonds would  have grown to only $3.62 in 
constant dollar terms, whereas $1 .OO invested in T-bills (and rolled over for 
the sixty-four years) would have grown to a real $1.37. 
In  another paper  (MaCurdy and  Shoven  1990), we  document that stock 
investments generated higher returns for all holding periods twenty years and 
longer over the period 1926-89.  Any one-time investment held for more than 
twenty years (with returns reinvested) would show a higher return if  the asset 
was the S&P 500 than if it was a diversified portfolio of bonds, regardless of 
the date of purchase and the date of sale. The size of the equity premium is a 
fairly well-known puzzle since it seems to indicate an implausible degree of 
risk aversion. Our results in this other study suggest that holding a diversified 
portfolio including bonds rather than a pure stock portfolio for a period of 
more than twenty years would require an almost infinite degree of risk aver- 
sion since there has never been a span of  time for which this strategy would 
be profitable. 
We  recognize that pension participants did not have the precise investment 
vehicles that we use to represent the returns on stock and bond funding strat- 
egies. Index funds, which nearly exactly reproduce the Ibbotson series, have 
been available only for the past few years. However, the S&P 500 index is a 
standard benchmark against which other diversified stock portfolios are com- 
pared. 
In our pension accumulation calculations presented below,  we attempt to 
capture the situation faced by college professors in making choices between 
CREF (a broadly diversified common stock portfolio) and TIAA (a bond port- 
folio). To compare the rate of return on the S&P 500 with the return on CREF, 
figure 2.1 plots the two annual rate-of-return series. The correspondence be- 
tween the two series is so strong that one can barely identify the presence of 64  Thomas E. MaCurdy and John B. Shoven 
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two plots.  We  interpret this  finding to indicate that the  Ibbotson  series for 
stocks is a reliable proxy for CREF’s rate of return. 
The bonds making up TIAA are higher yield and lower quality than those 
in the Ibbotson index. The Salomon Brothers long-term corporate bond index 
is a measure of the return earned by portfolios of high-grade corporate bonds. 
Funds that concentrate on private placements,  “high-yield”  bonds,  and debt 
contracts with equity “kickers,”  such as TIAA, may perform differently than 
the Salomon Brothers index. Therefore, we feel that, while the Ibbotson bond 
index is completely satisfactory as a measure of the return on high-grade cor- 
porate bonds, it is a somewhat less satisfactory proxy for TIAAs returns. 
Annual total rate of return on CREF and the S&P 500 
2.2  Pension Accumulations 
To characterize the implications of alternative investment strategies in pen- 
sions, we require a specification for the life-cycle profiles describing the earn- 
ings of cohorts over time, combined with an assumption about the fraction of 
earnings invested in pensions at each age. We formulate profiles designed to 
measure the earnings of  academics over the period  1926-89.  We  further as- 
sume that each person contributes a fixed fraction of his current earnings to 
his pension fund each month throughout his working career. While we con- 
sider the case of college professors in carrying out this exercise, we  believe 
that our findings are broadly applicable to any pension  system where contri- 
butions are made periodically and are proportional to earnings. 
2.2.1  Construction of  Earnings Profiles 
To describe our formulation of earnings profiles, let w(c, a)  denote the an- 
nual nominal earnings of individuals who started jobs as assistant professors 65  Stocks, Bonds, and Pension Wealth 
in September of the calendar year c when these persons reach a  years of aca- 
demic experience. The variable c indexes the cohort to which an  individual 
belongs; it signals the academic year in which the group enters the profession. 
Assuming that all individuals making up an entry cohort are the same age in 
year c, the variable a  equals the age of the cohort in the current year minus 
the cohort’s age at the time of entry. With the variable t introduced to represent 
the relevant calendar year, the quantity w(c, t -  c)  gives the annual earnings 
of cohort c in academic year t. 
To  construct the earnings quantities o(c, a),  we combine data on academic 
salaries from several sources. From the Campus Report published by Stanford 
University on 22 March 1989, we  acquired information on “cross-sectional” 
wage profiles for the academic year 1988-89. This publication reports graphs 
of the median of the annual salaries of assistant, associate, and full professors 
as functions of  their seniority, which corresponds to a plot of  the function 
o(t - a,  a)  against a.  Using  data from the Campus Report  to construct 
linear salary schedules for the year r = 1988 for assistant, associate, and full 
professors, we developed the following cross-sectional profile: 
(1) ~(1988  -  a,  a)  g(a) 
34,039 + 640a  fora = 0, 1,.  . . ,  5; 
43,357 + 1,725(a -  6)  for a = 6, 7, . . . ,  10; 
64,012 + 622(a - 11)  for a  2  11. 
This formulation presumes that an individual spends six years as an assistant 
professor, five years as an associate professor, and the remainder of his or her 
career as a full professor. 
Combining this cross-sectional profile with data on the growth of  faculty 
salaries over the period 1926-89  provides sufficient information to calculate 
values for the annual earnings of all cohorts over this period. Define r(t)  as the 
annual nominal growth in faculty salaries. Assuming that wage growth in each 
year exerts a common influence on the earnings of  all cohorts in that year 
yields the result: 
k=t+l 
where the spline function g(a) is  given by  (1). We  impute values for the 
growth rates  r(t) for the  years  t = 1926,  . . . , 1989 from three distinct 
sources.  Over  the  period  1929-65,  we  compute  growth  rates  as 
r(r) = [Ave(t) -  Ave(t - l)]/Ave(t - 1) where Ave(t) represents the aver- 
age annual salary in year t of  full professors in the University of California 
system reported in  The Centennial Record  of  the  University of  California 
(1967). Over the period  1966-67,  we calculate r(t)  with Ave(t) designating 
the average annual salary of full-time faculty at Stanford University reported 66  Thomas E. MaCurdy and John B. Shoven 
in the AAUP Bulletin, published  in the summers of  1966 and  1967 by  the 
American  Association  of  University  Professors.  Finally,  over  the  period 
1968-89,  we construct r(t)  using the average annual salary of  full professors 
at Stanford University  as the measure of Ave(t), which comes from unpub- 
lished data supplied by the Provost’s Office of Stanford. 
2.2.2  Pension Values with Constant Allocation Policies 
To calculate the accumulation of pensions, we assume that an individual of 
cohort c invests a fixed fraction of o(c, t - c) in each year t over his or her 
entire working career. We  consider careers of  twenty-five, thirty, thirty-five, 
and forty years for those cohorts who entered and retired during the period 
1926-89.  A pure stock pension strategy refers to a policy whereby individu- 
als allocate all their contributions to stocks. A pure bond strategy corresponds 
to all contributions invested in bonds. To  compare the performance of  these 
two pension policies,  we calculate the ratio of what a person would have ac- 
cumulated at the time of retirement by adopting a pure stock strategy to the 
accumulation associated with a pure bond approach. This ratio is independent 
of the absolute level of salaries and the fraction of salary applied to retirement 
accumulations (as long as that fraction is constant). 
Figures 2.2-2.5  present plots of these ratios evaluated at the year of retire- 
ment for careers of  twenty-five,  thirty,  thirty-five,  and  forty years,  respec- 
tively. The numbers associated with these plots are reported in table 2.1 under 
the columns entitled “Stock( l),” The term “Stock( 1)” signifies that an individ- 
ual following a pure stock strategy makes only one transfer out of  stocks at 
the very end of his or her career; there are no transfers from stocks to bonds 
just prior to retirement in an attempt to reduce risk. 
Figure 2.2 shows the results for a twenty-five year career. We feel that this 
is an  improbably  short career  for retirement  accumulation  (particularly for 
professors whose plan  is almost completely portable from one employer to 
another). The ratio ranges from  1.17 to 5.06 with an average value of 2.64. 
That is, even for careers this short, accumulation in stocks has always led to 
more wealth (and a proportionately larger annuity). On average, a 100 percent 
stock strategy would have resulted in more than two and a half times as much 
retirement wealth as a 100 percent long-term corporate bond strategy. For re- 
tirements in the  1980s, the ratio ranges from 1.28 to  1.78, averaging  1.48. 
While these ratios are small relative to those in the three to five range for the 
mid-1950s to mid- 1960s, they still indicate that the stock accumulator always 
did better than the bond accumulator, and by a very significant amount. 
Figure 2.4 shows our calculations of the same ratio for the more realistic 
career length of thirty-five years. With this horizon, the ratio ranges from 1.56 
to 6.25, averaging 3.58. Thus, the person who  systematically  accumulated 
stocks over a thirty-five-year career always ended up with at least 56 percent 
more pension wealth than someone who made the same pattern of contribu- 
tions to a portfolio consisting of only long-term corporate bonds. On average, 67  Stocks, Bonds, and Pension Wealth 
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Fig. 2.3  Ratio of stock to bond accumulation  for a thirty-year career 
the stock strategy would have produced a monthly annuity in retirement that 
was over 3.5 times as large. The ratios for a forty-year career are even more 
dramatic, as seen in figure 2.5, with the minimum ratio of  1.95. Thus, the 
worst experience for a stock accumulator occurring in our data over a forty- 
year career was to end up with only 95 percent  more pension  wealth than 
someone investing in bonds. 
It almost certainly is true that the variance in wealth at retirement is lower 
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safer investment vehicle seems fundamentally incorrect. The final wealth dis- 
tribution  with  stock accumulation,  even with  its higher  standard  deviation, 
covers a range that is everywhere higher than the range associated with the 
bond distribution. 
2.2.3  End of Career Strategies 
The results  shown in  figures 2.2-2.5  assume that  the  stock  accumulator 
does not deviate from a pure stock allocation strategy right up until retirement. 69  Stocks, Bonds, and Pension Wealth 
At  the time of  retirement, the wealth  accumulation  is evaluated  and  a life 
annuity purchased.  A natural question to ask is whether one can significantly 
reduce the variance in the outcome by converting the accumulated stocks to 
bonds at multiple dates near the end of one’s career. The idea, of  course, is to 
reduce the importance of the level of the stock market on a particular day. The 
pension accumulator automatically does a lot of averaging by buying stock on 
many different dates. We now briefly examine the effect of some averaging on 
the sale dates. 
We explore two simple end-of-career strategies designed to mitigate the risk 
of cashing out a 100 percent stock pension on a single day. The first involves 
making four transfers out of stocks, with one-quarter of the total accumulation 
sold at four distinct dates. We designate this investment policy as “Stock(4).” 
Nine months  prior to retirement, an individual  following a Stock(4) policy 
allocates  all  remaining  pension  contributions  to  bonds  and  converts  one- 
quarter of his or her accumulated stock shares to bonds at quarterly intervals 
of  nine, six, and three months before  the retirement  date. In the month  of 
retirement, the resulting value of the diversified portfolio determines the pen- 
sion accumulation associated with the Stock(4) policy. The second investment 
strategy examined the Stock(8) policy, eight transfers out of stocks. Following 
this strategy, an individual allocates all pension contributions to bonds starting 
twenty-one months prior to retirement.  At quarterly intervals of  twenty-one, 
eighteen, fifteen, twelve,  nine, six, and three months preceding retirement, 
the person  converts one-eighth  of  the stock accumulated  at the twenty-one- 
month point into bonds. Thus, the pension value corresponding to a Stock(8) 
policy involves selling stocks at eight distinct dates distributed over a two- 
year period preceding retirement. 
Table 2.1 reports the stocWbond ratios for the Stock(4) and the Stock(8) 
pension policies for careers of  twenty-five, thirty, thirty-five, and forty years. 
Figures  2.6 and 2.7 plot the results comparing these two policies with  the 
Stock( 1) strategy considered  above for the twenty-five- and thirty-five-year 
careers, respectively. 
Naturally,  such short-run  sales strategies do not change the general shape 
of the gross return ratio curves. They do, however, effectively reduce the vul- 
nerability to short-term movements in stock prices at the end of one’s career. 
This is perhaps most clearly shown in  1961 and 1962 in table 2.1. Consider 
the case of a thirty-five-year career. Between  1961 and 1962, the ratio of the 
sell-all-stocks-at-the-end  strategy to bonds falls from 6.25 to 4.88, whereas 
both the one- and the two-year averaging strategies do not suffer such sudden 
changes. The period  1986-88  offers another example. Recall that our partici- 
pants begin their careers in September and retire twenty-five,  thirty, thirty- 
five, or forty years later at the end of August. As many of us can remember, 
the stock market rose sharply in the first nine months of 1987, only to crash in 
October. For thirty-five-year careers, the sell-all-stocks-at-retirement strategy 
results in multiples relative to the wealth of bond accumulations of 1.72, 2.19, Table 2.1  Pension Savings: Ratio of  Stock Plan to Bond Plan 
25-Year Horizon  30-Year Horizon  35-Year Horizon  40-Year Horizon 
Retirement 
Year  Stock(])  Stock(4)  Stock(8)  Stock(1)  Stock(4)  Stock(8)  Stock(])  Stock(4)  Stock(8)  Stock(1)  Stock(4)  Stock(8) 
1951  2.463 
1952  2.681 
1953  2.613 
1954  3.121 
1955  4.562 
1956  5.031 
1957  4.699 
1958  4.273 
1959  5.063 
1960  4.078 
1961  4.514 
1962  3.454 
1963  3.788 
1964  3.879 
1965  3.749 
1966  3.270 
1967  3.483 
I968  3.169 
1969  3.054 
1970  2.451 
















































































5.208  6.250 
4.852  4.884 
4.400  5.639 
4.378  6.091 
4.507  6.198 
4.460  5.675 
4.300  6.168 
4.208  5.677 
4.269  5.561 
3.872  4.463 

















5.914  6.233  6.664  6.495 
5.525  7.107  6.473  6.367 
5.377  6.897  6.950  6.533 
5.484  7.056  7.322  6.959 
4.990  5.909  6.313  6.608 
4.397  5.905  5.935  5.914 1972  2.359  2.256 
1973  2.022  2.071 
1974  1.474  1.610 
1975  1.450  1.369 
1976  1.418  1.417 
1977  1.165  1.215 
1978  1.224  1.134 
1979  1.254  1.157 
1980  1.583  1.457 
1981  1.781  1.772 
1982  1.307  1.408 
1983  1.522  1.379 
I984  1.453  1.426 
1985  1.276  1.307 
1986  1.343  1.308 
1987  1.763  1.487 
1988  1.283  1.267 
1989  1.487  1.372 
Summary statistics for entire period: 
Minimum  1.165  1.134 
Maximum  5.063  4.693 
Average  2.640  2.555 
Std dev  1.230  1.155 
Average  1.480  1.418 
Std dev  .I77  ,135 
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Fig. 2.6  Ratio of  stock to bond accumulation for a twenty-five-year career 
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Fig. 2.7  Ratio of stock to bond accumulation for a thirty-five-year career 
and  1.56 for retirements  in  1986, 1987, and  1988, respectively.  The stock 
accumulator who gradually converts to bonds over the final two years of his 
or her career realizes the much more stable set of ratios of  1.66, 1.72, and 
1.65. 
2.3  Allocation Policies of TIAA-CREF Participants 
Despite  the  fact that  stocks have  outperformed bonds over long holding 
periods, many people saving for retirement use bonds or saving accounts as 73  Stocks, Bonds, and Pension Wealth 
accumulation vehicles. The same is true for many other investors with pre- 
sumably long horizons such as universities and foundations. For the purposes 
of this paper, we are most interested in the accumulation choices of professors 
for their retirement annuities. 
TIAA-CREF  generously  shared  some  information  about  the  allocation 
choices of  its participants. The percentage of  participants with various allo- 
cational choices are shown in figure 2.8 for the period 1969-87.  These figures 
are for the basic TIAA-CREF retirement annuities accumulation plans and not 
for supplemental retirement annuities. It should be noted that CREF was not 
instituted until July 1952. Between the time of its inception and 31 December 
1966, every contribution to CREF had to be accompanied by a contribution of 
at least as much to TIAA. Beginning in  1967, the premium allocation rules 
were changed to permit the payment of up to 75 percent of total retirement 
plan contributions to CREF. The rules were further changed on  1 July 197  1 to 
provide complete flexibility, permitting the allocation of  premiums between 
TIAA and CREF in any proportion, including 100 percent to either company. 
Figure 2.8 shows that almost half of TIAA-CREF participants allocate their 
premiums  on  a fifty-fifty basis.  This has  been  true throughout  the period 
1969-87.  Surprisingly, at least to us, the  100 percent to TIAA option has 
become increasingly popular through time (being chosen by 22-24  percent in 
the 1980s), as has the 75 percent TIAA-25  percent CREF option (being cho- 
sen by  13-14  percent in the 1980s). The 100 percent CREF choice has been 
made by  only about 3 percent of participants ever since this first became an 
option in 1971. 
We  have been able to obtain only a little information on the allocational 
choices by  participants of  different ages. In figure 2.9, we  show the alloca- 
Fig. 2.8  Percentages of TIAA-CREF participants with indicated portfolio 
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Fig. 2.9  Distribution of new supplemental retirement annuity participants by 
allocation choice and age 
tional choices by age of new supplemental retirement annuity participants in 
1984. Roughly 80 percent of the people who signed up for supplemental re- 
tirement annuity accounts choose to allocate 50 percent or less to stocks at all 
ages.  One hundred percent stocks is not a common choice at any age. While 
it is true that more of the over 60 age group allocate all their funds to TIAA, 
our general conclusion from figure 2.9 is that there are no great differences in 
allocation by age. 
2.4  Concluding Remarks 
All the material presented in the paper has been from the point of view of a 
participant in a defined contribution pension system. However, we think that 
it is applicable to a wider class of problems, including the funding of defined 
benefit retirement plans by corporations. The findings simply say that system- 
atic contributions proportional  to earnings over a career have always led to 
more wealth at the time of retirement if  the investments  are in stocks rather 
than bonds. This information seems completely relevant to an employer who 
has promised retirement benefits  based on final salary and years of  service. 
The defined benefits can be funded with smaller cash contributions owing to 
the higher rates of return earned on stocks over long horizons. 
As we have already stated, we find the results of this paper to be striking. 
Not  only has  an all stocks  strategy always bested  an all bonds one for all 
careers exceeding twenty-five years, but it has also always yielded more than 
the popular fifty-fifty allocation or any other constant mix of  stock and bond 
purchases. While it is impossible to predict the likelihood that this dominance 
will continue, we find the evidence favoring stocks for long horizons over- 
whelming. 75  Stocks, Bonds, and Pension Wealth 
To  answer the first question usually asked of us, Yes, we are allocating 100 
percent of our pension contributions to stocks. 
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Comment  Jonathan S. Skinner 
One finds many significant  regression  coefficients in empirical studies,  but 
few empirical facts. By “empirical facts” I mean results unaffected by model 
specification  or estimation  technique-in  short,  findings  about  which  all 
economists agree. In their paper, Thomas E. MaCurdy and John B. Shoven 
present a particularly interesting fact; in every twenty-five year period since 
1926, the stock market has outperformed bonds. As they show, accumulated 
wealth from an all stock pension was as much as four times the accumulated 
wealth from an all bond pension. 
If their finding holds true generally, it has far-reaching implications. First, 
as they note, the theoretical debate over the “equity premium” puzzle becomes 
irrelevant since there is no degree of risk aversion that would lead one to hold 
bonds if  stocks outperform  bonds  in every state of  the world.  Second, the 
result implies a massive, and highly costly, degree of ignorance and irrational- 
ity on the part of investors. Their result using data on TIAA-CREF pension 
holdings is particularly strong since one cannot blame a short-sighted portfo- 
lio manager for choosing bonds over stocks; each individual employee is free 
to choose his or her own portfolio  allocation of  stocks and bonds.  The au- 
thors’ finding therefore casts doubt on investor rationality-the  bedrock as- 
sumption of the theory of finance. 
One could of course appeal to a portfolio explanation for why TIAA-CREF 
enrollees hold bonds. For example, suppose an enrollee finances 90 percent 
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of his or her house with a fixed-rate mortgage. Given the substantial year-to- 
year variation in housing prices,’ the homeowner can reduce his or her overall 
risk exposure by matching the long-term  mortgage liabilities with long-term 
bonds. In this view, holding bonds in a pension fund may not make sense in 
isolation, but  it does make sense in combination  with  the other household 
assets. 
There are two problems with this explanation for holding bonds. The first 
is that the price of (long-term) bonds is negatively correlated with the nominal 
interest rate.  If high nominal rates also depress housing prices, then buying 
long-term bonds could potentially increase overall risk. The second is that, if 
stocks dominate bonds in every state of the world, there is no combination of 
risk aversion or  risk correlation that would imply that bonds should be held.* 
No matter what happens in the housing market, the risk-averse homeowner is 
still better off holding stocks over bonds. 
The key question is whether the sixty-three years of data from 1926 to 1989 
can allow one to conclude that stocks will dominate bonds in “all states of the 
world.” The problem with calculating long-term yields of  stocks versus bonds 
is that there are not really sixty-three independent observations since the re- 
turn between, say, 1926 and 195 1 obviously will be highly correlated with the 
return between  1927 and 1952. There are less than three twenty-five-year pe- 
nods in the authors’ data set, so we may reasonably conclude that the relevant 
degrees of  freedom for making their inference are between three and sixty- 
three.  Hence, standard  errors on past  stock and bond  returns as applied to 
future returns may be quite generous given the long investment horizons in- 
volved. 
One strategy to test the strength of their result is to extend the period of 
analysis.  Stock and bond  data exist from  1872, allowing  one to roughly 
double the size of  the sample. Using data on real stock yields calculated by 
Robert Shiller of Yale University and railroad bond yields from the 1949 His- 
torical Statistical Abstract, I calculated the relative return on stocks and rail- 
road bonds since 1900, assuming that the individual placed $1 .OO each year 
in the “pension”  fund. I  calculated  that, for every twenty-five-year period 
since 1900, the “pension”  in  stocks outperformed  the  same investment  in 
bonds, even had the investor cashed out the stock portfolio at the depth of the 
Great Depression. If the investor had held off until 1935, the twenty-five-year 
stock investment would have beaten the bond investment by nearly three to 
one. So, in this respect, MaCurdy and Shoven’s argument is even stronger- 
there is no twenty-five-year  period  since 1900 during which stocks did not 
outperform bonds. 
The story is different between  1872 and  1899. As Snowden has carefully 
1. See James Berkovec and Don Fullerton, “A General Equilibrium Model of Housing, Taxes, 
and Portfolio Choice,” NBER Working Paper no. 3505 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, November 1990). 
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Source: Kenneth Snowden, “Historical Returns and Security Market Developments, 1872- 
1925,” Working Paper no. ECO 891001 (Greensboro: University of North Carolina, October 
1989). 
Ratio of stock to bond accumulation for fifteen-year holding period, 
1872-1901 
documented, bonds generally  outperformed stocks during this period.3 The 
real geometric mean return on stocks from 1872 to 1899 was 7.25, while the 
corresponding return on high-grade rail bonds was 8.20.4 In part, the higher 
return was a consequence of  unexpected deflation during the period and the 
(unrealized) possibility that the bonds would be repayed under an inflated sil- 
ver standard.  Furthermore, both  the bond  and the stock market were domi- 
nated by railroad company issues. 
A similar exercise to that performed by MaCurdy and Shoven is shown for 
the period  1872-1901  in  figure  2C.1.  Because  the period of  analysis  is so 
short, I focused on fifteen-year periods in which the investor contributes $1  .OO 
per year along  with  the  accumulated  proceeds  from previous  years. As in 
MaCurdy  and Shoven’s paper, the ratio calculated is the accumulated  stock 
wealth divided by accumulated bond wealth. During half the retirement dates 
between  1886 and 1901, the bond portfolio outperformed the stock portfolio. 
3. Kenneth Snowden, “Historical Returns and Security Market Development,  1872-1925,” 
Working Paper no. ECO 891001 (Greensboro: University of North Carolina, October 1989). 
4. While railroad bonds dominated the bond  market during this period, the geometric mean 
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And,  as noted  above,  bonds  outperformed stocks during the entire period 
1872-99.  This historical excursion therefore leads to a modification of  the 
authors’ statement that “there has never been a span of  time for which this 
strategy  [of  holding  a  portfolio  with  bonds]  would  be  profitable.”  The 
amended version is that, in the 117 years since 1872, there was one twenty- 
eight-year period (and many overlapping fifteen-year periods) during which 
railroad bonds outperformed stocks. This reversal does not deflect the main 
thrust of  MaCurdy and Shoven’s result since, even when  bonds did outper- 
form stocks, it was not by  a large amount. But if there is any positive proba- 
bility that bonds will yield a higher return than stocks, then investors can be 
rational, if astonishingly risk averse, to hold bonds. 